The lackadaisical approach of education departments and State Commissions for Protection of Child Rights (SCPCRs) in implementing and enforcing the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009—particularly Section 12(1)(c)—has allowed this constitutionally mandated provision to steadily wither away. In the absence of robust enforcement, private schools have increasingly exploited loopholes to evade their statutory obligations. For far too long, SCPCRs and education departments have operated under the mistaken belief that merely issuing guidelines for admissions of children from Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) under this provision suffices.
That complacency is now set to end.
In a landmark judgment delivered on 13 January 2026 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 10105 of 2017, the Supreme Court of India unequivocally reaffirmed the importance and enforceability of Section 12(1)(c). The Court held that it is both necessary and compelling to frame subordinate legislation—through binding rules and regulations—prescribing the method and manner in which children from weaker and disadvantaged sections are to be admitted to neighbourhood schools. The Court categorically observed that, in the absence of enforceable rules, the constitutional mandate of Article 21A and the statutory policy embodied in Section 12(1)(c) would remain a “dead letter.”
Accordingly, the Court directed the appropriate authorities to frame and notify, under Section 38 of the Act, necessary rules and regulations for implementing Section 12(1)(c), in consultation with the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR), the SCPCRs, and the National and State Advisory Councils. The Court further directed that the NCPCR be impleaded as a party respondent and tasked it with collating information on the status of issuance of such rules by States and Union Territories. An affidavit is to be filed before the Court by 31 March 2026, and the matter is listed for further hearing on 6 April 2026.
While this judgment marks a significant turning point—and the coming months are likely to witness the replacement of mere guidelines with binding subordinate legislation capable of transforming the lives of millions of children—it is equally important to recognise that this is perhaps the first time since the enactment of the RTE Act that such a clear and authoritative exposition of Section 12(1)(c) has been provided. This judgment should therefore serve as a training and sensitisation module not only for policymakers and education administrators, but also for all elected representatives—Members of Parliament, Members of Legislative Assemblies, councillors, and panchayat members—so that the full enabling potential of this provision is understood and realised across society.
The origins of the case lie in a deeply troubling but familiar reality. In 2016, the petitioner approached a neighbourhood school seeking admission for his children under the free and compulsory education mandate. Despite information obtained under the Right to Information Act showing that seats were available, the school denied admission. Even after the Zila Parishad, Gondia, addressed a letter to the Deputy Education Officer directing the school to admit the children—taking note of the petitioner’s extreme poverty and the fact that his residence was within three kilometres of the school—the school failed to comply, citing non-adherence to the online admission procedure.
Left with no alternative, the petitioner approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Shockingly, the High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner had failed to take “appropriate steps” to secure admission for his children and therefore had only himself to blame. The so-called “appropriate steps” referred to the failure to apply through the online process for the 25% quota for children from weaker and disadvantaged sections.
Recognising that such situations would continue to recur unless systemic issues were addressed, the Supreme Court deemed it necessary to treat the matter as one warranting authoritative precedent. The Court undertook a broader examination of the efficiency and effectiveness of procedures adopted for implementing Section 12(1)(c) and appointed Mr. Senthil Jagadeesan as amicus curiae to assist in this exercise.
The Court’s analysis is rooted in a correct understanding of the statutory framework and constitutional philosophy. The promise of education under Article 21A is to be realised through common neighbourhood schools, not through segregated or parallel systems. The legislative choice to implement the right to education through neighbourhood schools is a deliberate constitutional strategy aimed at operationalising equality of status, dignity, and social integration during children’s formative years.
In upholding Section 12(1)(c), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that children’s rights impose corresponding obligations on the State—not merely to respect, but also to protect and fulfil those rights. This includes regulating private educational institutions to ensure that children’s rights are not violated even in non-State spheres.
Significantly, the judgment advances a correct constitutional understanding of fraternity. It rejects the long-held but erroneous notion that fraternity is a vague or unenforceable value. Constitutional jurisprudence requires fraternity to be read as an actionable principle that obligates the State to structure institutions in ways that foster coexistence, mutual respect, and a sense of common membership. Unlike liberty and equality, which are often articulated as individual claims, fraternity is relational and institutional—it enables individuals to shed “suspect identities” rooted in caste, class, or hierarchy and to form solidaristic bonds.
Seen in this light, the 25% inclusion mandate under Section 12(1)(c) in unaided neighbourhood schools is not a standalone welfare measure. It is a constitutional instrument to realise fraternity and the holistic “development of the child,” as envisaged under Articles 21A and 39(f). The neighbourhood common school system under the RTE Act is central to democratising education and dismantling entrenched social inequalities.
The contemporary notion of “inclusive education,” much like earlier concepts of “common” or “neighbourhood” schools, is premised on the understanding that children from diverse backgrounds and with varying abilities achieve their highest potential when educated together. Inclusive schooling aligns seamlessly with constitutional values of fraternity, social justice, and equality of opportunity.
The rationale for fixing the inclusion figure at 25% is also empirically grounded. Census 2001 data shows that Scheduled Castes constitute 16.2% and Scheduled Tribes 8.2% of the population—together accounting for 24.4%. Additionally, the Tendulkar Committee estimated the population below the poverty line at 37.2%. Given that economic deprivation often overlaps with social disadvantage, a 25% reservation for children from weaker and disadvantaged sections is both reasonable and representative.
The judgment also provides a compelling rebuttal to those who evaluate school performance solely through short-term outcomes. Education is an act of faith and long-term social engineering, not a quick-fix intervention. Recognising that socialisation takes time—for children and teachers alike—the RTE Act mandates entry-level inclusion at pre-school and Class I. As successive cohorts enter and progress, schools gradually develop a diverse population across all classes, enabling children to grow together, form lasting bonds, and transcend social barriers.
This phased integration allows schools to build professional capacity to address the intellectual and emotional needs of diverse learners. Children below eight years of age are still forming social identities; early exposure to diversity therefore offers the strongest chance for success. Diversity enriches learning for all, while segregation impoverishes the educational experience—whether in private or government schools.
Crucially, the Constitution recognises elementary education as a fundamental right—a positive right that carries corresponding duties. The RTE framework identifies five duty bearers: (i) the appropriate government, (ii) the local authority, (iii) neighbourhood schools, (iv) parents or guardians, and (v) elementary school teachers.
Section 6 imposes a duty on the appropriate government to establish neighbourhood schools. Local authorities play a complementary role. Under Section 12, neighbourhood schools—whether aided or unaided—are obligated to provide free and compulsory education. Parents and guardians are duty-bound under Section 10 to ensure that their children are admitted to and attend a neighbourhood school. Teachers, whose role in nation-building is paramount, are constitutionally recognised as duty bearers under Article 51A(k) and must be accorded due respect and support.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has rightly characterised the implementation of Section 12(1)(c) as a national mission. Its effective enforcement has the potential to be truly transformative. Every institution and every individual—Central and State Governments, advisory councils, commissions, schools, and citizens alike—stands as a duty bearer in fulfilling this constitutional promise. -AN
